Wow, what a bug. I expect the exploit is literally as simple as trying to ssh in as a user with the password has ‘*’ in /etc/shadow and typing anything as the password.

To the extent that systems that are configured in the vulnerable manner exist in the wild, I’m surprised they weren’t exploited years ago by trivial ssh bots.

P.S. Wow, I’m reminded of just how awful traditional UNIX-y C APIs and code are.

P.P.S. The musl code in question is nuts. The API it implements is awful. Seriously, here’s the manpage:

https://man.archlinux.org/man/crypt.3.en

You can’t call this function correctly. sshd’s “fix” is basically to assume that a too-short return is an error return instead of a success return.

PAM is also awful, but this is worse.

musl only, the quick fix:

     PasswordAuthentication=no

Which is a good advice in general.

How do you break back into your digital life? You wake up in a strange place. Something happened. Everything's gone. No wallet/keys/smartphone/tablet/laptop. How would you get back into your digital life given only a laptop with access to the Internet, unless something, somewhere is passwordauthenticate=yes.

> You wake up in a strange place. Something happened. Everything's gone. No wallet/keys/smartphone/tablet/laptop.

at this point the _last_ thing i care about is my email.

where am i? am i ok? how are my friends/loved ones?

once those are in place, it becomes clearer how to get back to "normal"

The somewhere for password authentication is a place you have physical access. Not ssh.

I walk to my pc and type ssh-keygen. If i can’t do that I’ve got bigger problems. “I must be able to recover remotely using a memorised credential” is a terrible requirement.

Yeah your vault has password authentication. Your password manager in other words. Your vault is where you store your private ssh keys, and or the passwords for the keys.

Remotely: An encrypted file with a seed / master passwords to all the other data, published under a public url you can remember, but not linked anywhere and not listed.

Locally: Same, but printed out, laminated, in a safe place with other documents.

1Password subscription and the memorized key. 1Password is the only place my ssh private keys are stored.

This looks terrible for musl, what a collection of terrible decisions on their part. I guess I'm staying away from it.

Who does PasswordAuthentication=yes in this day and age anyway.

People who use AuthenticationMethods "publickey,password"

You must present a key first after which you must enter a password.

Just do no password at all.

Putting the one in 1fa? No thanks.

As this is apparently affecting openwrt, probably a fair number of openwrt users, if I had to guess

>We consider the root cause of this bug to be outside OpenSSH itself, but we're in a good position to deliver a mitigation quickly.

So not a ssh issue but an issue specific to Linux using "musl libc without PAM".

I'm sure some people running lightweight containers just had a heart attack.

I would imagine the vast majority of lightweight containers don't contain an ssh server?

I presume Dropbear, thus musl-based OpenWrt routers are also not affected? Not that Dropbear has been an example in that regard.

There is this write-up/fancy page from the person who found the vulnerability[0] (HN discussion[1], how I found this thread).

At the bottom of that it says dropbear is unaffected.

> on debian, ubuntu, fedora or anything else with glibc? going through pam? dropbear? openbsd? you're fine

[0] https://sshhole.com/

[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50378228

Since after you posted, various people in the thread have reported dropbear is not affected

AFAIU because the bug is in musl and not in OpenSSH