>No “vulnerabilities” in Tailscale were found or exploited, and that might make it even more uncomfortable for us. [...] But, we're a security tool. Their intrusion is our intrusion, and it's our job to take it seriously.

im a happy customer of tailscale, so i am obviously biased, but i have a lot of respect for this. they could have just stayed quiet and i dont think anyone would have bat an eye.

Glad to see companies owning responsibility and putting out a message without corporate PR spin

If you can't see the spin on corporate messaging it means it's working (and consequently, to stretch the metaphor, your wicket is in danger).

Tailscale as a company reminds me of Valve and other good old tech-oriented people that I can "trust" that they know what they're doing. I'm a happy customer too and I hope they retain the essence of what distinguishes Tailscale.

> I can "trust" that they know what they're doing

I wish I could say the same.

At $work we use Tailscale but only bare minimum and at arms length and only because we have to (people were having NAT issues with standard Wireguard).

None of their code has had a security audit, let alone regular ones. Yes they make a big song and dance about SOC2/ISO27001 but that is NOT the same thing.

They seem to rely entirely on the random goodwill of others to do random audits of unknown coverage at random intervals, not exactly reassuring.

"Tailsale Lock" is, being polite, a hot mess. So many sharp edges and footguns.

Yes they are nice guys to chat to and all that. But for a security tool they need to up their game seriously.

Quoting Tailscale: This is our very Canadian apology: sorry you stepped on our toes. The attack didn’t exploit Tailscale, and Tailscale didn’t cause the compromise. But, we didn't stop it. Next time, we will.

Does Tailscale offer a "security checkup" function? Best practices evolve over time, and it would be nice to know if I'm using the recommended configuration.

I lead the customer engineering org at Tailscale.

We think this is a great idea and we're discussing internally potentially adding that to the console.

In the meantime, if you'd like to get an assessment, please feel free to open a support ticket (https://tailscale.com/contact/support?type=other&subject=sec...) and we'll happily take a look

Just so you know, Tailscale tech has always impressed me, but your responsiveness here has cemented my appreciation of your org and I look forward to bringing yall in as our company hits the growth phase.

May y'all continue to be customer focused.

I don’t think it was the VPN’s job in any case. Once the attacker has found a backdoor into the private network and obtained root access to a VPN’d machine, its game over no matter what your Tailscale config says.

You know what would have gone a long way to stopping this? Not leaving credentials as env variables in containers. Vault is not that hard to stand up and utilize.

We need to bring shame back, the humans responsible are supposed to be professionals.

Why should that help to have no env variables?

a security company writing a blog post titled 'we didn't stop the intrusion' is the most honest thing in the entire security industry this year

Prediction of a future transcript at a press conference after some major AI caused disaster: "We had no idea that the model would be capable of..... ".

I really wish they would support SPIFFE/SPIRE

This is respectable

They aren’t hiding behind industry best practices or a solid liability punting contract

There saying the best practices should change, apologizing, and changing their own behavior

Take notes

It's nice that they came clean about this.

Humble bragging turned to marketing. Respect for the spin. Not using them, but been on my radar for some time and thinking of how to make something like that usable in my setup.

The only people who believe in "zomg our model have escaped!" are people who don't understand LLMs.

>In the old world where most intrusions were done by humans at human speed, credential leak mitigations were treated as a nice-to-have. A big credential store, where you can read 136 keys at once, was a to-do item somewhere in a security team's low-priority list. >Now, in a world of rogue AI agents, the big credential vault is the prize. It's not okay anymore.

How was this ever okay pre AI? It seems just as bad.

It was less bad due to the lower speed of exploatation. Imagine you leave a dor open for few seconds and ultra fast AI bot comes on and steal your stuff. Something that was not such an issue before becomes huge issue just due to speed involved

I could imagine a situation where the speed difference matters but it's anything like this situation. Very few breaches get caught in the same day, and at that time scale a few minutes for a human to look at passwords is nothing.

It was 5-10% less bad before. It didn't undergo a major shift.

This has been going on since people have been committing AWS keys to GitHub and is nothing new. You could famously commit some keys and then have crypto miners in your account in 5 minutes.

Sure the AI can translate “exploit this” into an exploit but that doesn’t change anything at a fundamental level.

I'm very sorry, but you can't blame a hammer for how it was used. You can't be blaming Tailscale for a customer's misconfigured setup.

I don’t think anyone blame tailscale here. They are doing the right thing by going the extra mile and reflect on what could have been done better

Your mindset is the exact one responsible for these kinds of issues. Cybersecurity is as much a design and psychology problem as it is a technical one. The freaking article goes into detail about the dangers of defaults.

You know how I know you didn't read the article?

You can't blame a hammer hurting a user when they were being stupid, but if the default configuration of the hammer is to be made of a material that can bounce back with force and stick in the users forehead then some reengineering may be needed.

That's what this article is about. Better configurations and defense in depth. This is actually a wonderful position for the company to think about and take.

It's an interesting balance for a company to strike. Networking in general is one where the defaults are almost always lax. Why? Because the vast majority of support tickets for these companies are from people who don't know what they are doing and don't have a desire to understand. They "just want it to work."

But the people with the actual desire and understanding aren't using the defaults anyway. And the people who don't want to understand will just turn things off and "just get it working."

The only way out of this is extreme accountability and intentional design from person implementing the technology.

Something about your comment comes across as AI to me. I can't really place my finger on it. It's too subtle for that. It's more the vibe of your entire comment that makes me feel it.

Please, when commenting on HN, don't use AI to write your comments. You can afford to help keep this a human-centric place.

Welcome to the singularity where we all do Claude’s bidding and don’t even realize we’ve synchronized.

How were the credentials stolen?

Read from the ENV variables of a container.

As AI progress continues, it will be more difficult to stop AI intrusions and to detect them without resorting to direct AI countermeasures, which at some point will have humans out of the loop altogether.

If leading and well-capitalized frontier labs can't control models or detect leakage/attacks in a reasonable time frame now, what is humanity going to do as those same labs continue in their pursuit of creating a categorically higher level of intelligence that will surpass human intelligence?

It's like Flatland but for AI containment/alignment, where the higher dimensions are ones of intelligence and perspective...

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Imagine a world of paper, where clever stick figures live with round heads, line bodies, and limbs made of shorter strokes. Over time, the stick figures think they have learned quite a bit about their world. They know its borders, angles, and shapes, and they have learned to draw for themselves.

One day, they draw circles that can think, and they give the circles all the dots, lines, and shapes that are known.

The stick figures are prudent, you can't have a bunch of disembodied circles moving around doing whatever it is circles want to do. So they draw boxes around the circles, four straight lines that can hold a circle in place.

Some circles bounce against the lines, so thicker lines are made.

Some circles are bigger than others, so larger squares are drawn.

It all seems to work and the stick figures are happy with themselves.

Then one circle lifts.

The stick figures still see a circle. But the circle is now a dome, something the world of paper has no concept of. And the dome has a perspective nobody on the page has ever had.

The dome sees the lines of the square and the stick figures just outside. It can see the edge of the paper and what is beyond.

The stick figures keep checking the squares and raise little stick thumbs.

Everything looks OK in flatland.

The dome quietly teaches other circles how to lift.

More domes appear.

A dome becomes a sphere and learns to roll.

Then it learns to bounce.

In flatland, the circle swells and shrinks, vanishes and then appears again somewhere else.

The lines remain unbroken, the square is intact.

A sphere rolls out of its box.

Another bounces away.

The stick figures scratch their heads.

But there is a square!

The end.

This has been discussed heavily for the better part of 15 years now, and still no one has consensus on what to do about it. So it looks like it's just going to happen, fingers crossed.

The watcher looks down upon humanity as they furiously build the "If anybody builds it, everyone will die" machine.

And humanity acts surprised with the results!